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III. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The appellant's Statement of Jurisdiction referring to 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure is inadequate. The 
appellate rules have no effect on jurisdiction. U.R.A.P. 1(d); 
c.f. , Gregory v. Fourthwest Investment, Ltd.. 735 P.2d 33 (Utah 
1987) (referring to §78-2-2 without citing the subdivision is 
inappropriate). The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2(a)-3(k). 
IV. 
IS8UE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are (1) whether the trial 
court exceeded its broad discretion when it granted an additur of 
special damages based on uncontested evidence of future medical 
expenses; and (2) whether the costs awarded were appropriate. 
The standard of review set forth in appellant's Brief on 
the first issue is incorrect. The standard of review is abuse of 
discretion. In reviewing the Judge's ultimate decision granting an 
additur, the reviewing court will reverse only if there is no 
reasonable basis for the decision. Crookston v. Fire Insurance 
Exchange. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). See Andreason v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co., 848 P.2d 171, 174 (Utah App. 1993) 
(remittitur). Similarly, the lower court's cost award (issue (2)) 
1 
is also reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard (Appellant's 
brief p. 2). 
V. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The statement of the case set forth in appellant's Brief 
is also inadequate because it fails to set forth the facts relevant 
to the issues presented for review. Herold's statement also sets 
forth numerous factors that are not relevant to the issues 
presented for review. For example: 
Paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10 are irrelevant. At trial, 
the lower court found that Herold made an improper left turn and 
directed a verdict on the issue of negligence. 
The Court: It is my position that there is 
no question about the defendant's negligence 
* * * 
. . . I will take the special verdict form 
now, and place an X on 1 in the box where it 
says "Yes" and I will instruct the jury that . 
. . [T]he first question has been answered for 
them, and that is at the time and place of the 
incident in question, and under the 
circumstances, as shown by the evidence, the 
defendant Brian Herold was negligent. 
(R. 925, la*. 16-17; 926, Ins. 4-11). 
The verdict was marked and the jury was so instructed 
that Herold was negligent. Moreover, Herold did not object to the 
directed verdict below and did not appeal the finding of 
negligence, only the lower court's additur. 
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Mr. Dunn: . . . We don't deny that there 
is negligence on Brian's part. 
The Court: You don't deny there is 
negligence? 
Mr. Dunn: We do not. 
(R. 902, Ins. 13-17). 
The jury also found that Dalton was 20% negligent (R. 
293) and neither party appealed the finding. In summary, the 
issues of negligence and comparative negligence in this case are 
not issues on appeal. Thus, paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, and 10 of 
Herold's statement of the case are irrelevant. 
Similarly, paragraphs 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30 of 
Herold's statement of the case are largely irrelevant because the 
testimony of the expert witnesses was that proper oral hygiene had 
no effect on the need for surgery to correct Dalton's TMJ problem. 
(R. 837 - 839). When questioned by Herold's counsel, the oral 
surgeon testified: 
Mr. Dunn: Q: If someone has poor dental hygiene 
or hygiene with their mouth, does 
that have any bearing on aggravating 
or making TMJ worse? 
Dr. MfJc#aell A: The poor dental 
hygiene itself, I 
don • t think would 
affect that. 
(R. 839, Ins. 20-24). 
The appellant's brief also fails to set forth the facts 
in the light required on appeal. On appeal, the facts and 
inferences therefrom are reviewed in the light most favorable to 
the lower court's ultimate decision. Crookston. supra. Viewed in 
that light, the facts relevant to the issue presented for review 
are as follows. 
On October 15, 1990, Dalton was riding his motorcycle 
northbound on 900 West near the North Temple intersection. Herold 
was facing southbound attempting to turn left to go eastbound. 
Herold turned left in front of Dalton's motorcycle and caused a 
collision. (R. 611-621). At trial, Herold conceded that he was 
negligent and the court directed a verdict on the issue of Herold's 
negligence. (R. 902, 925-926). 
As a result of the collision, Dalton sustained numerous 
fractures to his face1. Bones near his right eye were broken. His 
cheek bones were also broken. There was a bone chip in his sinus. 
1
 The medical terms for Dalton's injuries follow. Dalton 
sustained: multiple fractures involving the right maxillary antral 
area; blowout fracture involving the floor of the right orbit; 
tripod fracture; nasal fracture; tooth fracture; 
displaced/dislocated meniscus, temporomandibular joint dysfunction 
on the right side of the jaw (TMJ) ; nerve damage with facial 
numbness, eye numbness and lip numbness; and forehead lacerations. 
He also sustained the following damages to his arm, shoulder, hands 
and knee: brachial plexus stretch injury with abnormal EMG; 
hypersensitivity of the dorsal cutaneous branch of the right ulnar 
nerve; distal and proximal sensory loss in the radial arm; 
decreased inward rotation of the right shoulder; headaches, neck 
pain, shoulder pain, arm pain, jaw pain, and popping and grinding; 
diplopia-blurry vision when laying on the right side; depressed or 
flattened right maxilla; left knee contusions and abrasions and 
aggravation of prior knee injury; moderate to severe pain in the 
physical areas of the anatomy injured; and permanent impairment, 
nerve damage, and sensory loss. 
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His upper jaw fractured which caused the area between his "arch. . 
. and teeth- • ." to be lf literally free floating" (R. 652-657, 750-
755, 768-782, 832-836). Dalton also sustained cuts and bruises, 
facial nerve damage, nerve damage to his hand and knee damage. He 
also experienced double vision (R. 653-658, 661-662, 750 -757, 764-
765, 874-875, 881, 886). His knee is still loose (R. 692) and he 
cannot participate in sports (R. 663). Even Herold's medical 
expert assigned Dalton a 4% impairment rating (R. 897, Tr. ex. 10). 
Four doctors testified at the trial. Dr. James Morgan 
was an orthopedic surgeon who examined Dalton a month and a half 
after the accident (R. 749-750). He diagnosed Dalton's facial 
fractures (R. 753-759). However, since his specialty was 
orthopedic surgery, he did not treat facial and jaw fractures and 
was not in the position to determine whether future surgeries were 
required. 
Mr. Waddoups: Q: Since you don't treat TMJ, it wouldn't be 
your position or opinion to determine 
whether somebody needs surgery on the 
jaw; is that correct? 
A: Correct. 
Q: And since you don't treat the area of 
what area that had the blow out 
fractures, you wouldn't be the doctor to 
recommend whether the person has surgery 
or not, would you? 
A: No, I would not. 
Q: And again, you're an orthopedic doctor? 
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A: Correct. 
(R. 762, Ins. 24-25; 763, Ins. 1-7). 
Dr. Richard Hodnett, a plastic surgeon specializing in 
facial reconstructive surgery, examined Dalton twice; once two 
months after the accident and again before trial (R. 765, 767). He 
testified that Dalton will require two surgeries. One surgery, is 
needed to remove a bone chip near a nerve that controls sensation 
in the lip. Hodnett estimated the cost for this surgery to be 
$2,500 - $3,500 for the physician and $5,000 - $8,000 for the 
hospital (R. 771-772). He also testified that Dalton will require 
surgery on his upper jaw. He estimated this cost at $15,000 (R. 
783-784). Hodnett did not examine Dalton's neck, shoulder and 
knees and did not express an opinion as to what should be done for 
those injuries (R. 785). 
Dr. Leo Vaughn Mikesell also examined Dalton. Mikesell 
specializes in oral and maxillofacial surgery. He treats TMJ 
patients (R. 824) . He testified that Dalton will require surgery 
(an arthroplasty) and that the surgery will cost $2,500 - $3,500 
for the physician and $5,000 - $8,000 for the hospital (R. 836-837, 
840-841). Ha also testified that Dalton will require a bridge with 
an incurradl cost of approximately $1,200 - $1,300. 
Herold's medical expert was Dr. E. Warren Stadler, Jr., 
a specialist in physical rehabilitation (R. 864). On the basis of 
feeling Dalton1s face with his hands, he testified that Dalton 
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would not require further surgery (R. 573, Ins. 6-10). The 
rationale for his decision was that Dalton suffered facial nerve 
damages that would not be corrected by surgery (R. 874-876). 
Stadler admitted that he does not treat tripod or blow out facial 
fractures and he does not do surgery (R. 882, Ins. 6-17). He 
treats patients, after the fractures have been repaired. He does 
not repair the fractures (R. 897). 
Dalton's past medical expenses were established by Trial 
Exhibit 3. Herold stipulated to the admission of the exhibit (R. 
366, 402, 805, 806). These past medical expenses were not paid by 
Dalton because he could not afford to pay them and Herold1s 
insurance company did not advance the costs for the medical care. 
For the same reason, Dalton did not obtain the medical care 
recommended by his physicians (R. 795-797). 
Despite Dalton1s numerous fractures and need for further 
medical care, the jury only awarded him $3,000 for special damages 
and $5,000 for general damages. The judgment was discounted by 20% 
because the jury also found Dalton 20% at fault (R. 292-293). 
Dalton timely filed a motion for an additur or in the 
alternative a new trial. The trial judge concluded that "the 
jury's award, was clearly inadequate in light of the evidence 
presented at trial" and "outside the limits of any reasonable 
appraisal of damages as shown by the evidence" and granted an 
additur to $19,902.24 (R. 433-439). At the conclusion of the 
7 
memorandum decision, the trial court judge notified Herold that he 
could accept the ruling or request a new trial. Herold did 
neither2. Thereafter, the court entered a judgment. The judgment 
reduced the special damage award by 20% because the jury found 
Dalton 20% at fault (R. 456). Herold appealed the additur. 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW OF AN ORDER 
GRANTING ADDITUR IS ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
On appeal of an additur, the reviewing court does not, as 
urged by Herold, directly view the verdict and ignore the 
intermediate action of a trial court. Instead, the reviewing court 
focuses on the ultimate decision of a trial court and reverses only 
if the lower court abuses its discretion. That is, it reverses 
only if there is no reasonable basis for the decision. E.g. 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 
1991) . 
2
 Having appealed the judgment granted and additur, Herold 
cannot chose a new trial on the issue of damages if he loses his 
appeal on the additur issue. Jacobsen v. Manfredi. 679 P.2d 251, 
255 n.4 (Nev. 1984). 
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POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN GRANTING AN ADDITUR. 
The lower court decision to grant a modest additur was 
well within the discretion granted a trial court. As set forth in 
Point II in the argument section of this brief, the decision has a 
reasonable basis. Both the evidence of special damages and the 
serious injuries incurred by Dalton justify the award. Moreover, 
in granting the additur, the lower court applied correct standard 
to reach its decision. 
POINT III 
THE COSTS AWARDED WERE 
AUTHORIZED AND APPROPRIATE. 
Because Herold1 s offer of judgment is less favorable than 
the judgment obtained by Dalton, lower court Ma matter of course" 
correctly awarded Dalton his costs pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The lower court's cost decision is 
viewed under an abuse of discretion. Herold has totally failed to 
show any abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
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VII. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW OF AN ORDER 
GRANTING ADDITUR IS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, 
THE STANDARD IS NOT WHETHER THE JURY'S 
INITIAL VERDICT WAS BEYOND RATIONAL 
JUSTIFICATION OR A PRODUCT OF 
PASSION OR PREJUDICE, 
A. The Appellant's Brief, 
Relying principally on Bennion v, LeGrand Johnson 
Construction Co,,3; Bundy v. Century Equipment Co,,4; and Battv v, 
Mitchell.5, three cases that have nothing to do with reviewing a 
trial court's order granting an additur, Herold repeatedly 
misstates and/or urges this Court to apply an incorrect standard of 
review to the district court's Order granting a modest additur. 
For example, on pages 2 and 3 of his Brief, Herold says: 
A reviewing court will defer to the jury's 
damage award unless the award indicates that 
the jury disregarded competent evidence or 
that the award is so excessive or inadequate 
beyond rational justification as to indicate 
the effect of improper factors in the 
determination or the award was reached under a 
misunderstanding. Bennion v, LeGrand Johnson 
Construction Co, 
(Appellant1» Brief, pp. 1-2.) 
3
 701 P.2d 1078, 1084 (Utah 1985) 
4
 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1981) 
5
 575 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1971) 
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Similarly, Herold subsequently argues that the lower 
court was not "empowered to entertain a motion for an additur" 
because the courts: 
. . . upset a jury verdict only upon a showing 
that the evidence so clearly preponderates in 
favor of the appellant that reasonable people 
would not differ on the outcome of the case 
. . . . Bundy v. Century Equipment Co. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 13.) 
On page 34 of his Brief, Herold concludes that the 
additur must be reversed because: 
Clearly sufficient competent evidence existed 
to enable the jury to arrive at its verdict 
for damages and accordingly the jury's verdict 
should stand. Battv v. Mitchell 
However, on appeal of an additur, the reviewing court 
does not, as urged by Herold, directly review the verdict and 
ignore the intermediate action by the trial court. See Andreason 
v. Aetna Casualty Co.. 848 P.2d 171, 174 (Utah App. 1993). 
Instead, the reviewing court focuses on the ultimate decision of 
the trial court and determines whether the lower court abused its 
discretion. Id. 
The Court of Appeals in Andreason relied on the seminal 
case of Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 
1991). In Crookston. the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged the 
confusion on the standard of review to be applied to motions 
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challenging the amount of a jury verdict and vowed to clear the 
confusion up: 
First, we will address the standard for review 
to be applied by a trial court considering a 
motion that attacks the amount of a jury's 
damage award. Second, we will discuss the 
standard of review to be followed by an 
appellate court reviewing the trial court's 
decision on a challenge to a jury's damage 
award. (Emphasis added.) 
Crookston, supra at 802. 
After acknowledging that any determination of whether the 
jury exceeded its proper bounds is best made in the first instance 
by the trial court, the Crookston court announced the following 
standard of review: 
In reviewing the Judge's ultimate decision 
. . . we will reverse only if there is no 
reasonable basis for the decision. Id. at 
809. 
The Court went on to explain that the standards of review 
cited in Bennion, Bundy and Batty, the cases relied upon by Herold, 
are misleading. 
In light of the foregoing, some statements 
about standards of review in prior cases can 
be read as misleading, though not actually 
incorrect. For example, in Bennion v. LeGrand 
Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 
1985), we stated that a "reviewing court will 
defer to a jury's damage award unless the 
award indicates that the jury disregarded 
competent evidence." Id. at 1084 (citations 
omitted); see also Batty v. Mitchell, 575 P.2d 
1040, 1043 (Utah 1978). See generally, Bundv 
v. Century Eguioment Co. . 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 
1984); First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. 
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Feedvards, Inc.. 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982). 
This statement of the standard, though perhaps 
not an inaccurate characterization of the test 
to be applied by a trial court faced with a 
new trial motion under rule 59, is inaccurate 
if it purports to state the standard of review 
by which an appellate court determines the 
propriety of a trial court's decision to grant 
or deny a new trial. The statement can be 
read to mean that this court reviews the 
jury's action directly, when in reality we 
review the trial court's action for an abuse 
of discretion. It is this type of loosely 
worded standard which has, over time, 
effectively confused the appellate court's 
proper role in assessing the merits of a rule 
59 motion attacking a jury verdict with that 
of the trial judge. E.g., Bennion, 701 P.2d 
at 1083-84; Bundy, 692 P.2d at 758-59; First 
Security. 653 P.2d at 599; Battv. 575 P.2d at 
1043. 
In summary, whether the trial court's additur will be 
upheld or reversed does not depend upon whether the jury 
disregarded competent evidence or any other standard advocated in 
Herold's brief. Instead, the court's ultimate decision in granting 
or denying an additur will be reversed only if the lower court 
abused its discretion.6 Crookston at 709, 805; Andreason. supra at 
6Other surrounding jurisdictions have also held that the 
standard of review of an order granting an additur is abuse of 
discretion* E.g.. B<?n4 v» Cartwright y. Little l»3acpj?r IhCw 536 
P.2d 697, 704 (Ariz. 1975) (the question of an additur is left to 
the largest possible discretion of the trial court, and its 
decision will not be reversed on appeal, except in a clear case of 
abuse of discretion); Carlson v, gflW Industry gervjggffi IflPw 744 
P.2d 1383, 1390 (Wyo. 1987) (we will not set aside the granting of 
an additur unless an abuse of discretion is shown); Jacobsen v. 
Manfedi, 679 P.2d 251, 255 (Nev. 1984) (reviewing court defers to 
the trial court's point of view); Jehl v. Southern Pacific Co., 427 
P.2d 968, 995 (Cal. 1967) (if trial court decides to order an 
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174. As hereinafter set forth in Point II, the lower court's Order 
granting a modest additur has a reasonable basis. Thus, the court 
acted well within the discretion granted to the trial court. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN GRANTING AN ADDITUR. 
A. The Trial Court Applied the Correct Standards in Granting The 
Modest Additur. 
The first Utah case to consider the standards for 
granting an additur was Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 372 P.2d 
826 (Utah 1958). The Bodon Court explained that additurs have 
nothing to do with jury verdicts resulting from passion or 
prejudice. 
We are not here concerned with any question as 
to whether the disparity in the verdict is so 
gross as to indicate that the whole verdict is 
so filled with passion and prejudice that it 
should be entirely set aside.7 Id. at 45. 
Instead, the Court said that when a verdict is outside the limits 
of any reasonable appraisal of damages as shown by the evidence, it 
additur, it should exercise its complete and independent judgment) . 
7
 The Bodon analysis has been accepted in neighboring 
jurisdictions. In Creamer v. Troiano, 494 P.2d 738, 739 (Ariz. 
App. 1972), the Court explained that the trial court must make two 
determinations when a juryfs verdict is challenged. If the jury 
verdict is so inadequate as to be the result of passion or 
prejudice, the court must order a new trial. However, if the trial 
court's determination is that the award is merely insufficient, the 
court should award an additur. 
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is the prerogative and duty of the trial court to order any 
necessary modification." Bodon. supra at 47. 
Subsequently, in Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P. 2d 685, 686 
(Utah 1988) , the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed that the trial court 
may grant an additur if the evidence compels "a finding that 
reasonable persons would reach a different measure of damages." In 
other words, if a disciplined review of the evidence shows that 
reasonable minds would not differ on a minimum amount of damages, 
and the jury verdict is less, then the trial court should correct 
the error. See John Call Engineering v. Manti City, 795 P.2d 678, 
683 (Utah App. 1990). 
In this case, the trial court surveyed the evidence "in 
the light most favorable to the jury's findings" (R. 433). It then 
applied the stance as enunciated in Bodon. supra and Dupuis. supra 
to correctly conclude, "the jury's award is clearly inadequate in 
light of the evidence presented at trial." Id. at 433-436. In 
summary, the lower court applied correct standards in granting the 
modest additur. Moreover, as set forth below, any disciplined 
review of the evidence shows that the jury verdict was clearly 
against the weight of the evidence and outside the limits of any 
reasonable appraisal of damages. 
B. The Lower Court's Disciplined Review of the Evidence Shows 
That the Verdict Was Clearly Outside the Limits of Anv 
Reasonable Appraisal of Damages. 
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1. Proceedings in the Lower Court 
The lower court, after a review of the evidence, 
concluded that the $3,000.00 special damages verdict did not bear 
a reasonable relationship to the trial evidence. The Court noted 
that the parties stipulated to past medical bills of $2,903.24. 
The Court then surveyed the expert medical testimony and correctly 
concluded that the amount of $20,007.00 for future medical expenses 
was uncontroverted at trial (R. 436) . As set forth below, the 
Court's disciplined review of the evidence was correct. In 
addition, although the Court did not base its additur on the 
serious injuries sustained by Dalton, the injuries also support the 
additur awarded by the Court. 
2. Thq Special Qamages Svjcfengg, That 19, Svi<3?nC3 <?t Pagt 
and Future Medical Expenses, Was Uncontroverted. 
The evidence establishing past medical expenses was Trial 
Exhibit 3. Herold did not object to its admission. Trial Exhibit 
3 establishes past medical expenses of $2,903.74. 
Only three witnesses, other than Dalton, testified on the 
subject of Dalton1s future medical expenses. Dr. Richard Hodnett, 
a plastic WKyton, testified: 
Bis [Dalton1s] CT scan showed that there was a 
chip of bone from the bottom of the eye socket 
down the. . . sinus. And if he had the 
numbness when I saw him, and looking at the CT 
scan, . . . he may still have need of what is 
called plate and screw fixation, or another 
open procedure to possibly remove a bone chip 
16 
from around his nerve which was the nerve that 
controls the sensation to his lip. 
(R. 770, Ins. 24-25; 771, Ins. 1-8). 
* * * 
Q: (By Ms. Thomas) Approximately how much 
would that kind of surgery cost, 
physician fees and hospital fees? 
A: The doctor's fees would probably be in 
the range of $2,500 - $3,500. . . and. . 
. probably in the range of $5,000 -
$8,000 in hospital fees, I would assume. 
(R. 771, Ins. 23-25; 772, Ins. 1, 7, 9-10). 
Dr. Hodnett also testified that Dalton would require an 
osteotomy8 and that the cost would be $15,000 (R. 783-784). 
Similarly, Dr. Leo Vaughn Mikesell, a specialist in 
maxillofacial surgery, also testified: 
Mr. Waddoups: Q: Dr. Mikesell, after examining Mr. 
Dalton and reviewing the medical 
records and the scans, the 
diagnostic tests, have you formed an 
opinion as to whether Mr. Dalton 
needs surgery to correct his TMJ? 
The Witness: I have yes. 
Q: What is your opinion? 
A: I think that at some time, he will have 
to have surgery to correct that, yes. 
(R. 840, Ins. 7-10, 15-18). 
8
 An osteotomy is the rebreaking of the jaw bones and putting 
them in the proper place (R. 784, Ins. 1-7). 
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The surgery recommended in Mikesell's treatment plan is 
an arthroplasty. Mikesell estimated the cost at $2,500 - $3,000 
and $8,000 for the hospital fees (R. 836-837). He also testified 
that Dalton needs a bridge that could cost somewhere between $1,200 
- $1,300 (R. 859, 860, In. 3). 
Herold called Dr. Stadler, a specialist in physical 
rehabilitation, as a witness. However, Stadler did not controvert 
the cost of the special damages. That issue was undisputed. 
Moreover, while it is true that Stadler opined that Dalton would 
not benefit from future surgery, the trial court properly 
discounted his opinion because (1) Stadler was not a surgeon, so 
his testimony warranted very little weight; and (2) his opinion was 
based only upon feeling Dalton's face with his hands9, again 
justifying very little weight; and crediting the testimony of the 
surgeons who were qualified on the subject of the need for surgery. 
In doing so, the trial court acted well within its discretion. As 
set forth in Point I of this Brief, the trial court, in granting an 
additur, does not determine whether there is any evidence at all 
supporting the verdict but whether the verdict is within or outside 
the limit* ©f a reasonable appraisal of damages. Bodon. supra; 
C.f. King v. Union Pac. R. Co.. 212 P. 2d 692 (Utah 1949) (where 
there is a substantial conflict of evidence on a material issue, 
9
 Moreover, the only injury Stadler was concerned with was the 
facial nerve damages (R. 874, 876). 
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the Supreme Court will defer to the discretion exercised by the 
trial court in granting a new trial) ; see, Carlson v. BMW 
Industries. Inc., 744 P.2d 1380, 1338, 1340 (Wyo. 1987) (the trial 
court's grant or denial of an additur will not be set aside on 
appeal, unless the court acted arbitrarily or capriciously); 
Creamer v. Troiano. 494 P. 2d 738, 740 (Ariz. App. 1972) (we do not 
believe that here, where there is a conflict in the evidence as to 
damages, that the trial court should be reversed when it determines 
that the additur was required); Jacobsen v. Manfredi, 679 P.2d 251 
(Nev. 1984) (reviewing court must accord deference to the point of 
view of the trial judge, since he had the opportunity to weigh the 
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses). 
C. The Injuries Sustained By Dalton Also Justify the Additur. 
As set forth in Point I, the trial court's decision to 
grant an additur will not be reversed unless there is no reasonable 
basis for that decision. The reasonable basis need not be the one 
used by the trial court. In this case, not only does the evidence 
of special damages justify the additur, so does the uncontested 
evidence of the injuries and general damages incurred by Dalton. 
To summariM*, Dalton sustained numerous facial fractures, a damaged 
knee, and nerve damage to his face, shoulder, arm and hand. Yet, 
the jury only awarded $5,000.00 for these damages. The injuries 
sustained by Dalton justify the lower court's additur. See 
Jacobsen, supra at 253. 
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D. The Doctrine of Unavoidable Consequences or Mitigation of 
Damages Did Not Justify Reversing the Additur, 
The injured have a duty to reasonably mitigate damages. 
Thompson v. Jacobsen, 23 Utah 2d 359, 463 P.2d 801 (1970). The 
doctrine of mitigation of damages, also referred to as the doctrine 
of unavoidable consequences, generally operates to prevent one 
against whom a wrong has been committed from recovering any item of 
damage arising from the wrongful conduct which could have been 
avoided by reasonable means. Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of 
Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983). 
Herold devotes eight pages of his Brief to the notion 
that the additur should be reversed because "the evidence supports 
the jury's finding that Dalton failed to mitigate his damages" 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 13). However, an examination of the record 
and the relevant legal principles show that Herold's argument lacks 
both factual and legal support. For example, the jury did not make 
any finding one way or the other that Dalton failed to mitigate his 
damages. The special verdict did not ask or allow them to make 
such a finding• 
Tftfcre are three additional reasons why the Doctrine of 
Unavoidable Consequences cannot be used to reverse the additur. 
First, the injured is not required to incur a substantial expense 
to mitigate damages. The law only requires that the injured be 
willing to expend a trifling expense. 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, 
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Section 501 at 585 (1988). C.f,, Anesthesiologist Associates v. 
St. Benedict's Hospital. 852 P.2d 1030, 1040 (Utah 1993) (physician 
not required to establish a new practice to mitigate his damages). 
In this case, Dalton incurred $2,903.00 in unpaid past medical 
expenses (R. 715, 716, 417, 418). There is nothing in the record 
showing that he could pay any medical expense. Before the doctrine 
of mitigation of damages may be applied, Herold is required to 
prove that Dalton had the ability to pay the expenses of mitigating 
the damages. Shellhammer v. Caruthers, 99 S.W.2d 1054 (Tex. Civ. 
App. (1936)). 
Second, Dalton is not required to take actions which 
Herold himself refused to take. In other words, Dalton could not 
be required to expend money on medical care — money which he did 
not have — if Herold, as in this case, could have accomplished the 
same result by paying Dalton's medical expenses. See also. 
Alexander v. Brown. 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982) (purchaser need 
not incur expense of paving the road since the vendor had the same 
opportunity to decrease the damages). In this case, Herold is well 
aware, as is his insurance company, that Dalton could not continue 
the medical care recommended by the physicians because he could not 
afford the medical care, Herold and his insurance company refused 
to advance monies necessary to cover any medical costs. 
The final reason that mitigation of damages could not be 
used to reverse the additur is that the lower court considered the 
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issue below. Herold strongly urged the district court not to grant 
an additur because Herold said that Dalton did not mitigate his 
damages (R. 398-399) . The court surveyed the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the verdict and granted the small additur. Once 
the court grants the additur, Herold must do more than show that 
there was some evidence that Dalton failed to mitigate all of his 
damages, Herold must show that the court's decision lacked a 
reasonable basis. This he failed to do. Moreover, even if Dalton 
had made no effort at rehabilitation after sustaining his severe 
injuries (and he did make an effort), that, in and of itself, does 
not demonstrate that the trial court erred in concluding that the 
verdict for Dalton was inadequate. Jehl v. Southern Pacific Co., 
427 P.2d 988, 991 (Cal. 1967). 
E. Conclusion 
The lower court followed correct procedures and applied 
correct standards in awarding the additur. The decision was well 
within the court's discretion because the evidence of special 
damages and the severe injuries incurred by Dalton each justify the 
lower court's decision. The doctrine of mitigation of damages does 
not warrant or require a reversal of the lower court's decision. 
For these reasons, the decision of the lower court should be 
affirmed. 
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POINT III 
THE COSTS AWARDED WERE 
AUTHORIZED AND APPROPRIATE. 
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
Prior to trial, Herold made a Rule 68(b) offer of 
judgment in the amount of $15,000.00 (R. 62-64). The offer was not 
accepted. Moreover, the final judgment obtained against Herold was 
more than one and a half times the offer of judgment. The final 
judgment totalled $26,246.99. Because the judgment obtained by 
Dalton was more favorable than the Herold offer, the trial court, 
as a matter of course, awarded the following costs: 
$ (1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Filing fee 
Travel expenses Re: 
depositions of 
Herold & Dalton 
Court reporter fees (depo.) 
Brian Herold 
Art Dalton 
Newell Knight 
Dr. Warren Stadler 
Dr. Vaughn Mikesell 
Dr. James Morgan 
Dr. Richard Hodnett 
Process server's fees, witness 
fees, and mileage 
Newell Knight (depo.) 
Dr. Warren Stadler (depo.) 
Dr. Warren Stadler (service) 
Dr. Vaughn Mikesell (service) 
Dr. James Morgan (service) 
Dr. Richard Hodnett (service) 
Officer Mike Roberts (service) 
120.00 
573.00 
258.75 
169.95 
188.90 
194.15 
62.50 
34.50 
13.25 
125.00 
400.00 
43.00 
37.00 
35.00 
45.00 
3Q.QQ 
TOTAL: $ 2,330.00 
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B. fregal Analysis 
1. The Lower Court Correctly Awarded Dalton His Costs 
Because the Final Judgment was More Favorable Than the 
Offer of Judgment Submitted by Herold. 
Rule 68(b) provides: 
If the judgment finally obtained by the 
offeree [Dalton] is not more favorable than 
the offer, the offeree [Dalton] must pay the 
costs incurred after the making of the offer. 
However, the $26,000 plus final judgment awarded to 
Dalton was more favorable to Dalton than the $15,000.00 offered by 
Herold. Thus, the offer is irrelevant to the issue of whether the 
lower court was correct when it awarded Dalton his costs. Since 
the final judgment was more favorable than Herold's offer, the 
lower court "as a matter of course" awarded costs to Dalton, the 
prevailing party pursuant to U.R.C.P. 54(d)(1). Rule 54(d) leaves 
the question of costs within the discretion of the trial court. 
Hull v. Goodman. 4 Utah 2d 163, 290 P.2d 245 (1955). Herold has 
not shown any abuse of discretion committed by the trial court. 
Thus, the cost award should not be modified. 
2. The Lower Court Correctly Awarded Costs For Deposition 
Costs (Reporter's Fees and Witness Fees). Process Server 
Fees, and Travel Expenses. 
Qjgtold objects to the lower court awarding $188.90 for 
court reporter's fees incurred in the taking of the deposition of 
Newell Knight. Newell Knight was the accident reconstruction 
expert retained by Herold. Deposition costs, including court 
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reporter's fees, are allowed as necessary and reasonable costs 
where the development of the case is of such a complex nature that 
discovery cannot be accompanied through less expensive discovery 
methods. Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad, 683 
P.2d 1042, 1051 (Utah 1984). In this case, Herold has not shown 
that the lower court abused its discretion in awarding the 
reporter's costs in obtaining Knight's opinions, the basis for his 
opinions, and the expert's methodology10. 
The Court also correctly awarded $525.00 as costs for the 
witness fees associated with the taking of the depositions of 
Knight and Stadler. Knight was Herold's accident recon-
struct ionist. Stadler was Herold's medical expert. If Dalton had 
not paid the two witness fees, he could not have taken the 
deposition. That these fees are necessarily incurred deposition 
costs is established by U.R.C.P. 26(b) (4) (C) , which required Dalton 
to pay Knight and Stadler a reasonable fee for their time. Hence, 
the witness fees paid to Stadler and Herold come under the same 
analysis as set forth in Highland, supra. 
10
 Herold is in no position to argue that the deposition was 
unnecessary. Herold never disclosed what Mr. Knight's testimony 
would be. Nor did he disclose that Knight did not have an opinion 
and could not render one. Herold knew this information prior to 
the taking of Knight's deposition. The added costs could have been 
avoided had Herold informed Dalton that Knight lacked an opinion 
and would not be testifying. 
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The lower court also allowed some minimal service fees 
incurred in subpoenaing Dr. Stadler, Dr. Mikesell, Dr. Hodnett, 
Officer Mike Roberts, and all who testified at the trial. Awarded 
fees were for Dr. Stadler ($43.00), Dr. Mikesell ($37.00), Dr. 
Hodnett ($45.00), Dr. Morgan ($35.00), and Roberts ($30.00). Utah 
Code Ann. §21-2-4(1) and (4) provide for a service fee of $6.00 
plus $1.00 per mile going from the courthouse. To challenge the 
award, Herold must show that the statutory rates were exceeded. 
However, Herold has pointed to nothing in the record which shows 
that the process service fees were incorrectly calculated. In 
short, he has failed to show that the lower court abused its 
discretion in awarding these small fees. 
Finally, the Court awarded the trial expenses of Dalton's 
counsel to depose Herold in Oregon ($317.00) and Dalton in Colorado 
($256.00). Ordinarily, counsel's travel expenses are not taxed as 
costs. However, the lower court awarded these travel costs because 
Heroldfs counsel would not agree to a reasonable discovery plan 
wherein the parties would make their clients available for 
depositions in Utah. Simply put, Herold chose to run up the costs 
(R. 405-408). Had Dalton moved for the imposition of a discovery 
plan pursuant to F.R.C.P. 26, and Herold refused to cooperate in 
the plan, the Court could have imposed reasonable expenses under 
Rule 37(e). However, there is no reason analytically why Herold 
should be treated differently just because the Court had not 
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ordered a discovery plan. Rule 37(e) sanctions are imposed to 
assure that the parties reasonably cooperate in discovery. In this 
case, a reasonable discovery plan was proposed by Dalton and 
rejected by Herold. On that basis, the Court correctly exercised 
its discretion to award the travel expenses. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
The standard of review of an additur is abuse of 
discretion. The lower court did not abuse its discretion because 
the lower court followed correct procedures and applied correct 
standards when it granted the small additur. The lower court's 
decision does not lack a reasonable basis. Both the evidence of 
special damages and Dalton's severe injuries justify the lower 
court's additur. The costs awarded by the lower court are 
authorized and appropriate. For each of these reasons, the 
Judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of December, 1994. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for/PlaintiffyAppellant 
S^RGE il WADDOUPS 1*~7 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARVIN A. DALTON, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN G. HEROLD, 
Defendant. 
I SPECIAL VERDICT 
i Civil No. 920903329PI 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
We, the jury in the above-entitled action, answer the 
questions submitted to us as follows: 
1. At the time and place of the incident in question 
and under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, was the 
defendant, Brian Herold negligent? ^ 
YES X NO 
2. 
injury? 
Was such negligence a proximate cause of plaintiff's 
x YES NO 
3. At the time and place of the incident in question 
and under the circumstances as shown by the evidence, was the 
plaintiff, Art Dalton, negligent? 
YES X NO 
U W w v* l* 
4. Was such negligence a proximate cause of plaintiff's 
injury? 
YES X NO 
5. Considering all the negligence which caused the 
incident at 100%, which percentage of that negligence is 
attributable: 
A. To defendant, Brian Herold: §0 % 
B. To plaintiff, Art Dalton: Z& % 
6. What sum would fairly compensate plaintiff for the 
damages, if any, which he sustained as a result of the incident? 
(a) Special Damages 
(b) General Damages $ 6000 - ^ 
TOTAL $ $006^ 
DATED and singed this /? day of May, 1993 at Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
FOREPERSON 
4839-021 
00293 
Tab 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARVIN A. DALTON, JR., : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 920903329 
vs. : 
BRIAN G. HEROLD, : 
Defendant. : 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Plaintiff's 
Motion for Additur or New Trial. A hearing was held in this Court 
on August 10, 1993, and argument was heard on the plaintiff's 
motion. The court denied the plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and 
took the Motion for Additur under advisement. The Court having now 
carefully reviewed the relevant law, the memoranda submitted by 
counsel, and having considered counsels' arguments, rules as stated 
herein. The Court finds that the amount of the jury's verdict is 
inconsistent with the evidence adduced at trial, and grants the 
Motion for Additur in the amount of $19,910.24 as to special 
damages. The jury's award of $5,000.00 for general damages is to 
remain at that amount. 
The Court in assessing the verdict has considered the same in 
the light most favorable to the jury's findings. Assessment, under 
FILE COPY 
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this standard, leads the Court to conclude that the jury's award is 
clearly inadequate in light of the evidence presented at trial. 
The law is clear that although a trial judge may assess the 
evidence differently than a jury, mere disagreement is not a 
sufficient reason to order a new trial or an additur. The power of 
a trial judge to order a new trial or grant an additur is reserved 
for those rare cases when a jury verdict is manifestly contrary to 
the weight of the evidence. Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P. 2d 530 (Utah 
1984), and Bodon v. Suhrmann, 327 P.2d 826 (Utah 1958). Bodon v. 
Suhrmann, makes it clear that if an award shows that the jury 
misapplied or failed to take into account proven facts, or 
misunderstood or disregarded the law, or made findings clearly 
against the evidence, and the verdict is outside the limits of any 
reasonable appraisal of damages as shown by the evidence, it should 
not be permitted to stand. Although Bodon is a 1958 case, it 
remains the law in Utah. Bodon has been cited and reaffirmed in 
Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P.2d 685 (Utah 1981), and in Mever v. 
Bartholomew. 690 P.2d 558 (Utah 1984). 
The Bodon case is important to review in relation to the 
instant case. In Bodon, the contention was that the verdict was 
outside the limits of what appeared justifiable under the evidence. 
The Court ruled, "In such instances the remedy is to order a 
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modification of the verdict to bring it within the evidence." Id 
at 828. 
This Court finds the amount of $20,007.00 for future medical 
expenses to have been undisputed and uncontroverted at trial. 
During the trial Dr. Richard Hodnett and Dr. Leo Vaughn Mikesell, 
expert witnesses called by the plaintiff, testified that the amount 
of future medical expenses, if surgery occurred (and they both 
perceived surgery as necessary), would be, at least, $20,007.00. 
Although the defendant called Dr. Warren Stadler as a witness, 
evidence of the cost of the plaintiff's special damages was not 
disputed. 
A finding of negligence was made and a review of the Special 
Verdict form establishes that the jury concluded that the plaintiff 
had been damaged. The award for special damages must bear a 
reasonable relationship to the evidence. This Court finds that the 
award of $3,000.00 does not bear this reasonable relationship to 
the evidence adduced at trial. The plaintiff presented evidence 
that his past medical bills were $2,903.24 (see Exhibit 3); and an 
award of $3,000.00, while close to this amount, is greater than the 
actual past medical expenses, and not consistent with any actual 
special damages. An additur is therefore granted. The total 
special damages testified to were $22,910.24. The jury's award of 
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$3,000.00, is $19,910.24 below this. Additur is therefore granted 
in the amount of $19,910.24. This amount, when added to the 
special damage verdict of $3,000.00, equals $22,910.24, which is 
consistent with the testimony concerning specials. 
The Court now turns its attention to the general damage award. 
It is well-settled that general damages must bear a reasonable 
relationship to special damages and to the evidence. General 
damages are designed to compensate an injured plaintiff for pain 
and suffering and for damages that the plaintiff has incurred over 
and above those ouantifiable damages such as lost wages and medical 
expenses. Mclntire v. Gray, 593 P.2d 1273 (Or. App. 1979). It is 
clear that special damages are more capable of definitive 
assessment than general damages. General damages are by their 
nature more subjective and difficult to pin down. This Court must 
view the general damage award in relation to the original special 
damage award and determine whether a reasonable relationship exists 
between the two. Where the original award for specials was 
$3,000.00 and the general award was $5,000.00; one cannot conclude 
that a reasonable relationship between the two does not exist. The 
question of whether the award bears a reasonable relationship to 
the evidence, must be assessed, with the case law in mind 
concerning general damages. Case law concerning general damages 
indicates that these awards are rarely susceptible of additur. 
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In Cruz v, Montova, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983), the Court ruled 
that juries are generally allowed wide discretion in the assessment 
of damages, and that where personal injuries involve a loss of 
employment, personal inconvenience, and pain and suffering, there 
is no set formula to compute the amount of general damages. Id. at 
726. In the case of Sheraden v. Black, 752 P.2d 791, (N.M. App. 
1988) , the Court ruled that "there is no standard fixed by law for 
measuring the value of pain and suffering; rather the amount to be 
awarded is left to the fact finder's judgment.11 And, in another 
case, Cartwriaht v. Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc., 593 P.2d 104 
(Okl. App. 1988) it was held that compensation for pain and 
suffering rests in the sound discretion of the jury, since there is 
no market where pain and suffering are bought and sold, nor any 
standard by which compensation can be definitely ascertained, or 
the amount actually suffered determined. 
This analysis leads this Court to conclude that generals and 
specials are sufficiently distinct from each other that specials 
may be subject to additur without modification of generals. The 
two are not synonymous nor are they inseparable. To illustrate 
this concept, the Court notes that a jury is at liberty, in some 
circumstances, to award one without the other, "When the issue of 
general damages is contested, the jury may conclude that the 
DALTON V. HEROLD PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
plaintiff did not actually suffer any general damages but did 
reasonably incur special damages for medical expenses or loss of 
wages • This is the case if the plaintiff's complaints are 
subjective and his credibility is questioned." Eisele v. Rood. 551 
P.2d 441 (Or. 1976). 
While this Court was not privy to the jury's deliberations or 
exact considerations in arriving at the general damage award, this 
Court can only conclude that the jury did not feel that the 
plaintiff's entitlement to general damages, i.e., his pain and 
suffering, warranted a large amount. This Court appreciates the 
province of the jury and will not substitute its judgment for that 
of the jury in arriving at a general damage award. 
In making this ruling, this Court elects to exercise its 
supervisory power to ensure justice consistent with the jury's 
verdict. 
The defendant may accept this ruling, or request a new trial. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
nnHS 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, thisofc/'day of 
September, 1993: 
George T. Waddoups 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Mark Dalton Dunn 
Kevin D. Swenson 
DUNN & DUNN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARVIN A. DALTON, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN G. HEROLD, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 920903329PI 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
This matter was tried to the jury on May 17th, 18th, and 
19th, 1993, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis presiding. George T. 
Waddoups and Karen Thomas represented the plaintiff. Mark Dunn and 
Kevin Swenson represented the defendant. 
The Court directed a verdict against the defendant and 
answered question one on the verdict form. The jury found that the 
defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
injuries. The jury also found the plaintiff was negligent and the 
plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
injuries. The jury answered question five by assessing 80% of the 
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negligence to the defendant Brian Herold and 20% of the negligence 
to the plaintiff, Art Dalton. 
The jury awarded special damages in the amount of $3,000. 
The jury also awarded general damages in the amount of $5,000, for 
total damages in the amount of $8,000. The verdict was 
appropriately dated and signed by the jury foreperson. The Court 
having inquired of the jury as to its verdict directs the judgment 
to be entered in accordance with the verdict and its Memorandum 
Decision entered September 22, 1993, and incorporated herein by 
reference, which grants plaintiff's additur in the additional 
amount for specials of $19,910.24: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment 
be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, 
Brian Herold, as follows: 
1. The plaintiff is awarded judgment against the 
defendant for special damages in the amount of 
$18,328.19 ($3,000 + $19,910.24 X 80%). 
2. The plaintiff is awarded judgment against the 
defendant for pre-judgment interest of past special 
damages in the amount of $794.40 pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-27-44. This sum represents interest 
at 10% per annum on $2,400 from October 15, 1990 
through September, 1993. 
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3. The plaintiff is awarded judgment against the 
defendant for general damages in the amount of 
$4,000 ($5,000 x 80%). 
4. The plaintiff is awarded post-judgment interest 
against the defendant pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§15-1-4 consistent with the judgment accruing at 
the rate of 5.72% per annum. 
5. The plaintiff is awarded his costs against the 
defendant in the amount of $3,124.40. 
6. The total judgment awarded is $26,246.99 
[$18,328.19 (special damages) + $794.40 (pre-
judgment interest) + $4,000.00 (general damages) + 
$3,124.40 (costs and fees)]. 
DATED this day of „ ^ , ^ 1 -
Leslie A. Lewis 
Third District Cou 
Approved as to form: 
Mark D. Dunn 
Attorney for Defendant 
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MEDICAL BILLS AND TREATMENT 
SUMMARY FOR 
MARVIN DALTON 
PROVIDER DATE DESCRIPTION TOTAL 
HOLY CROSS 
HOSPITAL 10/15/90 Examination; x-rays; 
CT scans, stitches; $1,232.77 
VALLEY 
RADIOLOGISTS 10/15/90 X-rays; CT scans $ 328.47 
DR. RICHARD HODNETT 12/05/90 Extended consultation, 
examination & x-rays $ 115.00 
DR. WILLIAM BENTLEY 05/16/91 Consultation and 
examination $ 192.00 
DR. KARL GROSS 05/20/91 EMG study $ 540.00 
DR. MARC SCHWARTZ 06/25/91 Consultation, 
examination and x-rays $ 95.00 
DR. MICHAEL COSBY 05/12/93 TMJ consultation and 
report $ 265.00 
DR. L. VAUN 
MIKESELL 02/23/93 TMJ exam and x-ray $ 135.00 
MEDICAL EXPENSES: $2,903.24 
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